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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] AD/DCI/NIPE/China

NGA Review
Completed.

**SUBJECT : Urgent Requirement for Priority
Collection Efforts Against Key
Chinese Communist Strategic Missile
Targets**

1. As you know, the Intelligence Community is now faced with the task of preparing another estimate on Communist China's strategic weapons program in the near future in response to a priority request from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. However, the uncertainties surrounding Chinese intentions and capabilities in this critical area, which were reflected in the NIE published on this subject in February, have not been resolved in the interim and have, in fact, grown even larger and more perplexing. A substantial level of activity has been noted in this program in recent months, and some very significant events could occur while the estimate is in preparation, including the initiation of booster flight tests of the first-generation ICBM system. We strongly recommend, therefore, that all possible actions be taken in the relatively short time remaining until the NIE deadline in about mid-October to maximize the intelligence collection efforts against Chinese missile-related targets.

2. Because the vast majority of information on developments in China's strategic missile effort is derived from analysis of satellite photography, we believe that COMIREX should be made fully aware of the criticality of the problem and give special consideration to insuring that the principal missile facilities receive above-average coverage in those KH missions programmed to be flown in the next four months.

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[REDACTED] is ideally suited for collection of data because (a) the photography obtained will be available for detailed analysis prior to

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the final preparation of the estimate and (b) it will be the [redacted] thus should [redacted] 25X1
as a matter of course provide more coverage of China than NRO
has been the case in the past. We would further recommend
that coverage of Chinese strategic missile targets be given
a high-priority in all other missions flown in this period,
even if only preliminary data is available prior to the
final approval of the estimate by the USIB.

3. In addition to the above actions, we also urge that serious consideration be given to the initiation of other types of collection operations which have the potential for producing critical information on the status of the strategic weapons program in the near term. Specifically, we believe that the use of the U-2R overhead reconnaissance system against the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Center (SCTMTC) would produce excellent results. We are convinced that such a mission is capable of significantly supplementing satellite photography of this extensive installation, as well as providing valuable data on facilities and activities there which are not readily obtainable with the current satellite coverage of this target.

4. As far as we have been able to determine, the U-2R has the following advantages over satellite photography in providing coverage of the SCTMTC:

a. it can be programmed to fly at times when weather conditions in the rangehead area are optimum; poor weather conditions have been a serious problem in this area in recent months and have precluded obtaining high-resolution coverage of critical facilities such as Launch Complex B

b. the camera system carried by the U-2R is technically capable of obtaining [redacted]

[redacted] and will also provide a [redacted]

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c. the U-2R flight plan can be programmed to get a good look at the widely dispersed SCTMTC facilities which are only rarely observed in satellite photography; this point particularly applies to the very critical instrumentation sites believed to be associated with the forthcoming ICBM flight test program

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5. The attachment to this memorandum contains a listing of specific Chinese missile targets which we believe should receive special collection emphasis during the next several months, together with a review of the significant developments noted there recently. These targets are listed in what we consider to be the most desirable order of priority.

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DAVID S. BRANDWEIN
Director
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

Attachment:
a/s

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**PRIORITY LISTING OF CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC
MISSILE FACILITIES REQUIRING COLLECTION ACTION**

1. Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Center

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a. Launch Complex B--This critical facility has not been observed in good-quality [redacted] because of poor weather and atmospheric conditions prevailing during each of the three passes made over the area since then. However, the available coverage indicates that Pad B-1 is probably approaching an operational status and could be used to support missile launchings in the relatively near future. Propellant storage facility checkout tests have apparently already been conducted. Construction of Pad B-2 appears to have progressed at a steady pace in recent months, but the unavailability of good-quality photography has seriously hindered efforts to make a reasonable postulation of the large vehicle which we believe will be launched from this facility when it is complete.

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b. Instrumentation Sites 17 and 18--These key facilities are believed to be associated with the support of firings from Complex B. The location of the sites to the southwest of Complex B, together with the orientation of Pad B-1, had suggested that extended-range ICBM flight tests would be conducted toward impact areas in the Indian Ocean. [redacted]

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facility is urgently required, together with repeat coverage of Site 18, if we are to make some sort of meaningful judgment in this respect in the forthcoming estimate.

c. Possible New Mobile Instrumentation Site--Fair-quality KH-4 photography of the Test Center [] revealed the presence of a possible new mobile-type instrumentation facility some 54 nautical miles northwest of Complex B and nearly on a line with Instrumentation Site 17. It appeared to consist of about 10 vehicles/pieces of equipment/temporary buildings []

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The timing of the appearance of this facility, together with its geographical location, suggest that it may be designed to assist in the monitoring of ICBM booster test firings from Pad B-1 in a generally westerly direction. High-quality photography of this site is needed to determine whether this hypothesis is valid.

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2. Peking Guided Missile Plant, Manyuan. []

The large vertical test tower originally constructed at this facility in the 1962-64 period has probably been used in both the MRBM and first-generation ICBM development programs.

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
3. Hu-ho-hao-t'e Solid-Propellant Rocket Motor Complex

Good-quality photography of this facility [] indicated that construction of a second relatively large horizontal static test cell is in the final stages of completion. It also revealed the presence of four possible rocket motors near the completed large test cell and possible nearby environmental conditioning building. The appearance of these suspect motors could mean that static testing activity has already begun or is about to begin.

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The size of the observed objects appeared to be compatible with missiles in the MRBM category or even possibly with the upper stages of an ICBM or second-generation ICBM. Repeated additional high-quality coverage of Hu-ho-hao-t'e is needed in order to confirm or negate the presence of rocket motors and attempt to determine whether there are any signs of static testing. Judgments in this respect will have a direct bearing on estimates of the future direction of the Chinese strategic missile effort involving composite solid-propellant systems.

4. Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Center

Launch Complex A--Erected missiles and/or ground support equipment of the type previously associated with the system believed to be in the MRBM category have been observed in generally poor-to-fair quality satellite photography of Complex A.

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5. Peking Guided Missile Development and Production Center, Ch'ang-hsin-tien

Static testing of liquid-propellant engines will continue at this facility as the production and flight testing of strategic missiles of various types progresses. The observation of such engines in very good-quality high resolution photography would be of valuable assistance in better estimating the technical characteristics of Chinese liquid propulsion missile systems. We have also observed what appears to be a diffuser at the horizontal test cell at Ch'ang-hsin-tien. The size of this object appeared compatible with the development of an upper stage for the MRBM. This could mean that preparations for a satellite launch attempt involving a modified MRBM are making progress.

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